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INJUNCTIONS IN LABOR DISPUTES: THE HISTORY
OF THE NORRIS-LaGUARDIA ACT
JON

R.

KERIAN*

INTRODUCTION

In view of the current move by the North Dakota State Legislature to appraise the labor laws of this state, a backward glance of
Chapter 34-08 NDRC 1943 is in order. This chapter is a state enactment of Public Law 64 (Norris-LaGuardia Act). The reason for
the act was "to amend the judicial code and to define and limit the
jurisdiction of the courts sitting in equity and for other purposes."
It was called anti-injunction legislation1 at the time of passage.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act was approved on March 23, 1932. It
was not rammed through the mill of Congress, nor was it ill-considered, indeed, it took 14 years of debate and committee reports
before it was voted upon, and when it was voted upon, it passed
almost as decisively as the Declaration of War after Pearl Harbor.
3
The vote in the Senate was 75 to 52 and 362 to 14 in the House.
Injunctive relief is an age-old concept, but for the purpose of this
paper we need only go back to 1895 and visit the celebrated case
In re Debs.4 Here was established the principle that the power to
issue injunctions and punish for their contempt in labor disputes is
inherent in the court. In the Debs case the American Railroad
Union combined for a strike, and an injunction was issued enjoining
the members of that union "from compelling or inducing or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, persuasion, force,
or violence, any of the employees of said railroads to refuse or fail
to refuse to perform any other duties as employees of any of said
railroads in connection with the interstate business or commerce of
such railroads or the carriage of the United States mail by such railroads or the transportation of passengers or property between or
among the states."'
The Debs injunction was granted under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and opened the flood gates of injunctive relief. That In re Debs
was the starting point for injunctions and labor disputes may be
shown from this calendar. In the 1880's 28 injunctions were issued;
a A 1957 graduate of the University of North Dakota School of Law, Mr. Kerian is a
member of the North Dakota Bar Association, and practices law in Grand Forks.
1. 75 Cong. Rec. 4052 (1932).
2. 75 Cong. Rec. 5019 (1932).

3. 75 Cong. Rec. 5511 (1932).
4. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
5. Id. at 571.
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after the Debs decision 122 were issued in the 1890's; and 328 were
issued from 1900 to 1909.6
The Clayton Act, which was passed in 1914, was to remedy the
abuses of the Sherman Act and to exempt labor unions from antitrust laws. Section 6 of the Clayton Act stated as the policy of the
act, "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural
and horticultural organizations instituted for the purpose of mutual
help and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members from such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objectives thereof; nor shall
such organizations or members thereof, be held or construed to be
illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the
anti-trust laws."7 The Clayton Act was hailed by labor leader Samuel Gompers as the laborer's "Magna Carta". s
Interpretive emasculation of the Clayton Act started quickly and
in 1921 the famous case of Duplex PrintingPress Company v. Deering9 held that the first paragraph of Section 20 of the Clayton Act
-which provides that injunctions shall not be granted in any case
between an employer and employees growing out of a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment, unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property or to property right, of the
party making the application, for which there is no adequate
remedy at law, and that such property right must be described with
particularity in the application which must be in writing and sworn
to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney-merely declaratory
of the law as it stood before. Thus the laborer's"Magna Carta"was
held to be nothing more than a re-enactment of the Sherman AntiTrust Act, and the specific provision that labor unions were exempt
from such injunctions was abrogated by the decision.
In one way the position of labor was distinctly worse under the
Clayton Act than it had been under the Sherman Act, for under the
act a private party could obtain injunctions against the persons
guilty of conduct in violation of these laws, whereas prior to the act,
the federal government alone could sign injunctions against unlawful restraint of trade.
The aim of employers basically was not to secure a permanent
restraining order but to secure a temporary restraining order. A
6. Witte, The Government in Labor Disputes, p. 84.

7. Cited by Rep. Ceier; 75 Cong. Rec. 5488 (1932).
8. 21 American Federationist 971.
9. 254 U.S. 443, 469.
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temporary order was the most impotant of all injunctive writs because strikes are usually won or lost within a few days and they
were issued as a matter of course. Chief Justice Taft, explaining
this before Congress, said, "The temporary restraining order is
served upon all strikers; they are not lawyers; their fears are aroused
by the process with which they are not acquainted, and, although
their purpose may have been entirely lawful, their determination to
carry through the strike is weakened by an order which they have
never had an opportunity to question and which is calculated to
discourage proceeding in their original purpose. " 1°
This deterent was the purpose for which injunctions were sought.
It broke the strike and compelled dissatisfied workers to perform
services disagreeable to them.
The majority of injunctions signed by the judges were comprehensive documents enjoining workers from doing legal as well as
illegal acts. Often times in restraining picket lines the court abridged
the right to peaceful assembly and signed a writ which restrained
"picketing, marching or congregating in the street near or in the
vicinity of the premises of the plaintiff;" picketing plaintiff's factory
within a radius of three blocks in all directions.1"
There were restraints against speech, "abusive language, "annoying language", "indecent language", "bad language", "opprobious
epithets", and specific words, such as "scab", "traitor", and "unfair". 3
Forbidding workmen to go on strike was an object of the injunction, 4 notwithstanding the numerous decisions which upheld the
worker's right to strike. In one case workers were enjoined from
taking a vote on the question of a strike and from counting any such
vote and "from reporting, writing, telegraphing or aiding or assisting in any manner related or connected with the taking, recording,
or acting upon such a referendum? 5
An injunction containing eviction notices was served upon striking coal miners" ordering them to get out of their houses by a
specific date.
10. Congressional Record, 60th Congress,

First Session; Appendix 576.

11. Reed Co. v. Whiteman; 238 N.Y. 545, 144 N.E. 885 (1924) (Court of Appeals
limited the injunction).
12. Id. at 546.
13. See ex parte Tucker, 110 Tex. 335 where defendant was discharged upon habeas
corpus after conviction for contempt of an injunction against villifying, abusing or using
opprobius epithets on the ground that the injunction was a violation of the State
stitution.

14. Bausch Machine Tool Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. 30, 120 N.E. 188 (1918).
15. A. R. Barnes & Co. v. Barry, 156 Fed. 72 (1907).
16. Clarksou Coal Mining Co. v. United Mine Workers, 23 Fl.2d 208 (1927).

con-
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In almost every injunction there was the catch-all or dragnet
phrase "from doing any and all acts in furtherance of any conspiracies to prevent the free and unhindered control of the business of
the complainants."
Appeals were rarely brought on injunction. Once the injunction
was granted, the strikers' ferver was abated and the strike was lost.
That the injunction successfully broke strikes and was rarely appealed may be seen from these figures. There were 118 reported
applications for injunction in the federal courts between the years
1920 and 1927. Nine were denied. There were only 33 appeals
from the restraining orders. In New York during the same period
there were 37 applications. Nine were denied and seven were appealed. 7
Blanket injunctions were frequently issued in this manner. The
Company vs. John Doe, John Roe and Mary Smith,
-Shoe
names ficticious, real names unknown to the complainant, and all
other persons unknown to the complainant and unknown to the
court, hereby are ordered and enjoined."8
One extreme case shows the sweeping effect of an injunction
which has unnamed defendants. In a railroad strike a dragnet injunction issued. A barber who was in no way connected with the
strike displayed a sign in his wnidow saying, "No scabs wanted in
here." He was found guilty of contempt of an injunction against
"abusing, intimidating, molesting or annoying." 9
In most jurisdictions there was more than one judge. An attorney
could make an ex parte application for injunction, take it to the
judge in the jurisdiction who was most liable to grant the remedy,
and the restraining order was signed almost immediately. Between
1910 and 1919, 446 injuctions were issued, and between January 1,
1920, and May 1, 1930, 921 injunctions were granted,2" and 300 injunctions alone were granted during the railroad shop craft strike
during 1921.21 During this last ten year period, the Clayton AntiTrust Act, labors' "Magna Carta", which sought to limit the issuance
of injunctions against labor unions, was in force. The Clayton Act
was clearly not the answer to the injunction problem.
THE NoRRis-LAGUARDiA ACT
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, which was born on March 23, 1932,
17. Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction, Appendices 1 & 3.
18. 75 Cong. Bee. 5480 (1932).

19. U.S. v. Taliaferro, 290 Fed. 214, Affd. 290 Fed. 906 (1922).
20. Witte, supra, note 6, at 84.

21. Senator George W. Pepper, address to American Bar Ass'n., cited at 75 Cong. Bee.
4619 (1932).
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after a 14 year period of gestation, attempted to correct the abuse of
the injunctions. The 1928 Republican National Convention at
Kansas City adopted a plank as follows, "the party favors freedom
in wage contracts, the right of collective bargaining by free and
responsible agents of their own choosing which develops and maintains that peaceful cooperation which gains its first incentive
through voluntary agreement.
"We believe that injunctions in labor disputes have in some instances been abused and have given rise to a serious question for
legislation."22
The Democratic National Convention at Houston, Texas, spoke
as follows: "We recognize that legislative and other investigations
have shown the existence of grave abuse in the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. No injunctions should be granted in labor
disputes except upon proof of threatened irreparable injury and
after notice and hearing, and the injunction should be confined to
'3
those acts which do directly threaten irreparable injury."
A. PUBLIC POLICY
The Norris-LaGuardia Act, to avoid the pitfall that killed the
Clayton Act, declares the policy of the United States in relation to
labor disputes. "This is the first time in the history of the United
States that an attempt has been made to declare, through an act of
Congress, the public policy of the United States in relation to the
issuing of injunctions in labor controversies. The object of setting
up such a policy is to assist the courts in the proper interpretation
of the proposed legislation ....
there is no doubt whatever but that
the Congress has the constitutional right to declare the public policy
of the United States upon any question upon which the Congress
has a right to legislate; and when such a public policy is declared,
it becomes the duty of all the courts to give effect to such policy
and carry it out in the enforcement of any law where such public
policy has application.
Where Congress has not declared a public policy, it is within the
province of the court to decide what the public policy is; but when
such public policy has been declared by Congress, it is the duty of
the court to follow such policy and to decide litigated questions
related thereto in accordance with the poiicy thus declared by Congress. This doctrine has been repeatedly upheld by both state and
federal courts." 24 The public policy declared in this act is as fol22. 75 Cong. Rec. 4502 (1932).

23. Ibid.
24. Senator Norris, 75 Cong. Rec. 4503 (1932).
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lows: "Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed
with the aid of governmental authority for owners of property to
organize in the corporate and other forms of owners associations,
the individual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment,
wherefore, though he should be free to decline to associate with his
fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, selforganization, and declaration of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and
that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in the declaration of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection
Senator Hebert of the minority members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee disliked the declaration of policy of the majority members and submitted a policy of his own which he stated "more nearly
approaches the pronouncement of the supreme court on the subject,
that it deals more equitably and more fairly with both sides to any
controversy and that it does justice to the employee without doing
any injustice to the employer." The minority declaration of policy
according to Hebert was based in part on Mr. Chief Justice Taft's
opinion in American Foundriesv. Tri City Trade Council (257 U.S.
209). Taft said at page 209:
"Labor unions are recognized by the Clayton Act as legal when
instituted for mutual help and carrying out their legitimate objectives. They have long thus been recognized by the courts. They
were organized out of the necessities of the situation. A single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer. He was dependent, ordinarily, on his daily wage for the maintainance of himself
and family. If the employer refused to pay him the wages that he
thought fair, he was nevertheless unable to leave the employer and
to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment. Union was assurance to
give laborers opportunity to deal on equality with their employer.
They unite to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a body
in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms
with them. They were withholding their labor of economic value to
make him pay what they thought it was worth. The right to com-

25. 29 U.S.C. 102 (1932).
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bine for such a lawful purpose has in many years not been denied
by any court."
Having that language of the supreme court in mind, the following
substitute declaration of policy was submitted to the Senate by
Senator Hebert: "Whereas, under prevailing economic conditions a
single employee is helpless in dealing with an employer, is ordinarily dependent on his daily wage for the maintainance of himself
and his family, is unable to resist arbitrary and unfair treatment;
and whereas it is essential (a) that he shall be free to associate with
his fellow workers and to form unions which will afford him and
them the opportunity to deal on a basis of equality with those by
whom they are employed; (b) that they may share equitably in the
production of labor and capital; (c) that both the employer and
the employee shall have full benefit of association, organization and
designation of representatives of their own choosing to negotiate the
terms of employment free from any interference, restraint, or coercion in their efforts toward mutual aid or protection."2' The Norris
declaration stood.
B. THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACT
The next section of the Norris-LaGuardia Act deals with yellow
dog contracts, 27 which, in the opinion of Senator Norris, should
have been declared null and void instead of being enforced by the
courts, because, (1) they were contrary to public policy under the
common law; (2) they were entered into without consideration;
28
and, (3) they were signed under duress and coercion.
In 1917 the supreme court of the United States placed its stamp
of approval upon such yellow dog contracts in the case of Hitchman
Coal and Coke v. Mitchell.29
Senator Hebert of Rhode Island, while in sympathy with the section declaring yellow dog contracts unenforcible, had misgivings as
26. 75 Cong. Rec. 4677 (1932).

27. 29 U.S.C. 103 (1932).
28. 75 Cong. Rec. 4504 (1932).

See also Rep. O'Connor, 75 Cong. Rec. 5464 (1932).

This following contract is cited as an example of a yellow dog contract by Senator Norris,

75 Cong. Rec. 4626 (1932)

"The undersigned applicant for employment by the Great

Northern Railway Company has
-..........---------(or at present employed) in consideration of the granting or continuance of such employment, hereby states and represents to the Great Northern Railway Cnmpany that he is not a member of or affiliated

with the National Association of Machinists; the International Brotherhood of Bolier Makers,
Iron Shipbuilders and Helpers of America; the National Brotherhood of Blacksmiths and
Helpers; the Amalgamated Sheet Metal Workers International Alliance; the International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; or the Brotherhood of Railway Carmen of America
and agrees that during the entire period of such employment, he will not apply !or
membership in or become a member of, or affiliate with, or lend any support, financial or
otherwise, to any of said organizations.
Upon the failure of the undersigned to comply
with the foregoing agreement, in every respect, it is agreed that this may be treated by
the Great Northern Railway Company as a resignation from its employment and that such
employment shall immediately cease.

29. 245 US 229 (1917).
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to the constitutionality of such a provision. He stated in his argument, "There is serious doubt in my mind as to the power of Congress to legislate upon contracts and to deny to parties the right to
enter into contracts. The right of contract is inviolate under the
constitution; and' the supreme court has repeatedly said that this
contract (yellow dog) is the valid exercise of that right. '3
In a further argument against the enactment of section three,
Senator Hebert stated that, "The title of the bill is 'A Bill to Amend
the Judicial Code and to Define and Limit the jurisdiction of Courts
Sitting in Equity.' We have limited ourselves to equitable proceedings." 3 In this argument Senator Hebert contended that the bill
which affects the court sitting in equity cannot declare public policy
on the matters of contract which actions on contracts are actions at
law.
The constitutionality of Section 3 was upheld in the case of Lauf
32
v. Shinner.
C. SPECiFic ACTS WHICH MAY NOT BE ENJOINED
Specific acts not subject to restraining orders or injunctions are
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act. These nine specific acts were
3
usually covered in blanket injunctions. 3
Section 4A provides that ceasing or refusing to perform any work
or to remain in any relation of employment shall not be enjoined.
Senator Hebert argued that to provide that an employee may refuse
to perform any work and yet continue in an employment relation
is to place the stamp of approval by legislative enactment upon a
breach of contract. Senator Hebert does allow, however, that the
framers of the bill did not have such a purpose in mind, but that
the paragraph was intended to place the employee outside of those
injunctive processes which have been so broad as to compel an employee against his will to perform a given task. The Bedford Stone
Company v. Stone Cutters Association (1274 U.S. 37) relying on the
4
case of Duplex Company v. Deering,3
held that the Stone Cutters
Association union who refused to work on "unfair stone" produced
by an anti-union quarry could be enjoined from such refusal, notwithstanding that the constitution of the Journeymen Stone Cutters
Association provided, "No member of this association shall cut,
carve or fit any material that has been cut by men working in
30. 75 Cong. Rec. 4679 (1932).
31.
32.
33.
34.

Ibid.
303 U.S. 335 (1937).
Rep. Garher, 75 Cong. Rec. 5492 (1932).
Supra note 9.
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opposition to this association." This is the type of decision Hebert
assumes the act was seeking to cure and he was sympathetic to the
intent but impatient with the legislative language. Senator Hebert
would have modified Section 4A to provide that no injunction would
issue upon the ground that an employee had ceased or refused to
remain in any relation of employment, eliminating the words, "ceased or refused to perform any work."
An opponent of the act, Representative Beck, cited two objections to Section 4. "First, Injunctions are to be largely limited to
'fraud or violence' ." Mass picketing, intimidations, trailing, besetting, importing, libeling and false statements, are to be beyond the
reach of injunctive relief.
Second, No injunction shall be issued against the organization and
maintenance of strikes even where said strikers are called in violation of contracts, to extort graft, to compel the employer to commit
a criminal act, to accomplish pooling purposes, to prevent freedom
of choice, to prevent the use of products which the public desire to
use, to coerce Congress and the executive.""
D. CONSPIRACY
Section 5 deals with the question of conspiracy, and states, "No
court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground
that any of the persons participating or interested in a labor dispute,
constitute or are engaged in an unlawful combination or conspiracy
because of the doing in concert of the acts enumerated in Section
104 of this title. 3 7 It became almost the universal practice for complaints in labor disputes to allege a conspiracy, a combination, a
blanket conspiracy and combination; an indefinite thing - allegations lacking specifications but intended to bring into the case every
possible suggestion or move made by every single person, singly or
collectively, in any labor dispute. The question propounded by the
majority members of the Senate Judiciary Committee who helped
draft this legislation was, "If a thing done by an individual is lawful, how can you make out of that thing something vicious and
criminal when two or more persons do the same thing?"

E.

APPLICATION OF RULE OF AGENCY

According to Senator Blain of Wisconsin, the purpose of Section
6 was to extend the sound law of agency, which prevails in all other
35. 274 U.S. 37, 48 (1927).
36. Rep. Beck, 75 Cong. Bee. 5471 (1932).

37. 29 U.S.C. 105 (1932).
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business transactions, to the officers, the members, the agents of
organized labor."
Section 6 says, "No officer or member of any
association or organization, and no association or organization participating or interested in a labor dispute, shall be held responsible
or liable in any court of the United States for the unlawful acts of
individual officers, members, or agents except upon clear proof of
actual participation in or actual authorization of such acts or of
ratification of such acts after actual knowledge thereof."3 9
Senator Hebert urged in his argument against this section that it
was not the establishment of a new law or agency but rather the
creation of a new rule of evidence. He argued, "The provisions of
Section 6 would alter that [law of agency] completely. It would
be subversive of that principle of the law of agency. At first, in
effect, if an employee or a man engaged in a labor dispute, acting
on the orders from him who directs that labor dispute, commits an
unlawful act, then the director of that labor dispute under whom
a given employee is operating, will not be liable for the consequences of such unlawful acts 'except upon clear proof of actual
participation in or actual authorization of such act or of ratification
of such act after actual knowledge thereof.'"
An amendment drafted by Senator Hebert would have provided
"that in any contempt proceedings based upon the commission of
such acts if the person charged makes ii clear that he did not actually participate in or actually authorize or actually ratify such act, he
shall be entitled to a public trial by an impartial jury. In this way
members of organizations engaged in labor disputes and their offices
as well, will be fully protected and at the same time the provisions
4
of the existing law will in no way be subverted."'
Arguing on this same point, Representative O'Connor held, "Section 6, which, like the other section of the bill, applies alike to organizations of employees as well as employers, remedies a grossly
unfair practice that has grown up of holding officers and members
of unions liable for damages for the acts of other members without
proof of participation or direction or ratification of such acts. The
bill merely requires actual proof of such participation, direction, or
ratification before the officers or other members can be held liable.
If this be a change in the 'law of agency' as some claim, it is at most
a change in the rule of evidence in civil cases only, a power well
recognized as lodging in Congress."4
38.
39.
40.
41.

75
29
75
75

Cong. Rec. 4629 (1932).
U.S.C. 106 (1932).
Cong. Bee. 4687 (1932).
Cong. Rec. 5463 (1932); see Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 238.
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F. ISSUANCE OF AN INJUNCTION
Senator Norris, explaining Section 7 and at the same time arguing
in its behalf, uttered this monologue, "Mr. President, this bill in
Section 7 provides for the procedure which shall be followed in case
application is made for a restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction. It provides that before a temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued, there must be an opportunity for the
defendants to be heard, and that at such hearing they shall have the
right to cross-examine witnesses who testify in behalf of the issuing
of such an order. The court must also permit the defendants to offer
witnesses and to take their oral testimony in open oourt; and the
court is not authorized to issue a temporary injunction after such
hearing unless the court finds that unlawful acts have been committed and will be committed unless restrained; that as to each item of
relief granted, greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by
the denial of relief than will be inflicted upon defendants by the
denial of relief; and that complainant has no adequate remedy at
law. The bill also provides that no temporary or permanent injunction shall be issued unless the court finds that the public officers
charged with the duty to protect complainant'sproperty are unable
or unwilling to furnish adequate protection. The bill, however, permits a temporary restraining order without notice, but in order to

secure this, the judge issuing the order must take the testimony,
under oath, of witnesses, and the evidence must be sufficient, if sustained, to justify the court in issuing an injunction upon hearing the
notice.
In other words, a restraining order without notice cannot be
issued except upon the sworn testimony of witnesses, and that testimony must be sufficient to sustain an injunction in case the same
evidence were offered with notice.
"This can be no hardship to the complainant in the case. If the
plaintiff is not able to produce sufficient eidence without notice,
certainly he would not be able to produce sufficient evidence with
notice. The greatest danger of damage comes in cases where restraining orders or temporary injunctions are issued without any
notice to the defendants. This, in effect, takes away the protection
with which the law always tries to surround the defendant by requiring that a summons be served or notice given before any judgment shall be rendered against him. It must also appear, before a
temporary restraining order can be issued without notice, that the
giving of the notice would of itself result in irreparable damage to
the complainant's property.
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"A restraining order without notice under the bill shall not be in
force longer than five days. The usual provision for the giving of
bond before the issuing of such temporary order is also provided for.
"It is also provided in section eight, that no restraining order or
injunction [sic] relief, shall be granted to anyone who has failed to
comply with any obligations imposed by law which is involved in a
labor dispute in question or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with the aid
2
of any governmental machinery provided for arbitration.."1
In concluding his argument, Senator Norris referred to the record
of Judge Wilkerson in the issuing of injunctions in labor disputes,
and by his narrative argues on behalf of Section 7 and 8. The Senator at page 4509 of the 75th Congressional Record says, "Judge
Wilkerson was appointed as District Judge by President Harding,
under the advice and at the suggestion of Attorney General Harry
N. Daugherty. Hardly was the ink on the commission dry before
the same Attorney General applied to this judge and secured of him
a sweeping injunction applying to many thousands of railroad employees. This injunction was issued at a time when the dispute between the railroads and their employees was in a fair way of settlement, and contained many of the obnoxious provisions which are
invariably included in labor injunctions."
Senator Hebert of the minority membership argues on Section 7
as follows, "Section 7 of the bill provides that no restraining order or
injunction shall be issued in a case growing out of a labor dispute
except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court.
"The section then proceeds to outline certain findings of fact
which must be heard prior to the issuance of a restraining order or
injunction. The first requirement is that unlawful acts have been
committed and will be continued unless restrained.
"Many of the restraining orders and injunctions heretofore issued
in labor disputes were much more far reaching in their effect than
the occasion required. Proof to sustain this view may be found in
the decisions of the supreme court. I am in sympathy with the
purposes sought to be attained by this part of the bill, but I believe
it should be modified in some respects. Under paragraph A of this
section the owners of property may not have relief where acts of
destruction are contemplated or threatened and must have actually
suffered injury before he can secure a restraining order or injunc42. 75 Cong. Rec. 4508 (1932).
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tion. Courts should be left free to restrain anyone from engaging in
unlawful acts and before they are committed.
"There is no element of justice in a provision of law which would
permit one citizen to destroy the property of another before any
court shall have the power to restrain him.
"The effect of this provision would be to work hardship upon employees as well as upon employers, because in the event that an employer should threaten to commit an unlawful act against the interests of the employee, the employee would have no redress, but
would be required to wait until after the act had been committed
before asking for a remedy. In other words, there can be no injury
to a wrongdoer if he be restrained from continuing his wrongdoing.
"Paragraph C of Section 7 brings in the law of comparative negligence. In cases of comparative negligence both parties are at fault,
and the question of which one is liable is determined by a comparison of the fault of each. In the case of injunctive processes to restrain illegal acts, such as violence and threats, no injury can, in
contemplation of law, be suffered by the party who is restrained
from continuing illegal acts. Paragraph C makes no distinction between acts which are lawful and those which are not. It simply
provides that as to the measure of relief granted the court must find
the greater injury will be inflicted upon the complainant by the denial of the relief than will be inflicted upon the defendant by the
granting of it.
"Paragraph E of Section 7 would require a complainant to show
affirmatively that the public officers charged with the duty to protect his property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection."43 All such officers are required to be given personal notice
and as this provision is now worded; it might be construed to mean
that every police officer in a city or town of whatever size must have
notice and must testify in any proceedings which may be had for
injunctive relief. It would impose an unusual burden upon a complaint; first, to ascertain the names and the duties of all officers
charged with the protection of property; and second, to prove that
they have failed to afford protection or that they are unable to do so.
"I can well imagine the burden placed upon a complainant where
he sought to have relief in injunction proceedings in a city the size
of New York, for instance, where he would be called upon to establish affirmatively either that the police or those charged with the
43. 75 Cong. Rec. 4687 (1932).
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enforcement of the law or the protection of his property were unable to afford protection or were unwilling to do so."
Senator Hebert wished to amend the act by eliminating Section
7E from the bill and then says, "I assume that none of the law
officers would admit that he was unwilling to enforce the law, and
perhaps few, if any, would admit that they were unable to do so;
but the more serious objection to this section, as it is worded, is the
requirement that all of the officers charged with the duty to enforce
the law shall be notified. It is easy to contemplate what an obligation rests upon the complainants under this provision if in a city
like New York, for instance, the officers charged with the enforcement of the law are to have notice before an injunction may issue;
but that, of course, is an extreme case.
"If this provision were limited to the sheriff of the county or their
chief of police of the city where the property is located, there
might be some reason for its inclusion in the bill; but, the section
reads, it seems to me to be impossible of enforcement."
Senator George, on the same section, questions the necessity of
4
the section, and the following dialogue ensued: 5
Senator George: "I can very well see why the section should
remain in the bill because I can understand, when a complainant
in equity is asking an injunction, that he should be able to show
that he is not able to protect his property through the ordinary
processes of law. But I cannot see any real reason why notice
should be given to any officer, because we can have in an equitable proceeding no substantial relief against an officer. The court
certainly would not undertake to direct him or enter any judgment against him or in any wise effect him by its final order."
Senator Walsh of Montana: "Let me tell the Senator what induced the committee to include those words."
Senator George: "I shall be very glad to know."
Senator Walsh: "Under sub-division E it will be observed that
the complainant seeking the injunction must represent that the
public officer charged with the duty to protect complainant's
property are unable or unwilling to furnish adequate protection."
Senator George: "I quite agree that that ought to be included.
I think it may well be included."
Senator Walsh: "I understand the Senator agrees that it may
well be included, but we do not want to make that imputation
against the officers without giving them an opportunity to reply
to it, and so notice is to be given to them that they may come in
and say, if they can say so, 'We are perfectly able to take care of
the situation.' We do not want to allow their integrity as officials
44. 75 Cong. Ree. 4996 (1932).
45. 75 Cong. Rec. 4998 (1932).
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to be impunged without giving them opportunity to be heard on
the matter."
Senator George: "I can see how that is commendable, and yet
it is wholly unnecessary because there is no need of making anybody a party to the litigation unless we are going to have some
substantial relief against that party. I rather think it is a dangerous provision for the reason that the defendant officers or respondent officers may come in and swear off the equity of the
bill."
Senator Walsh: "Let me remark that the officers will not be
made parties to the proceeding at all."
Senator George: "I thought the notice was to make them
parties."
Senator Walsh: "Oh, no, Observe the language. 'Such hearing
shall be held, after due and personal notice thereof has been given
in such manner as the court shall direct to all persons against
whom relief is sought and also to the chief of those public offices
of the county or city - and so forth. No relief is sought against
them, but they are given the opportunity to come into court."
Senator George: "It is not the purpose of the bill to make them
formal parties?"
Senator Walsh: "By no means."
Senator George: "Then, that removes, of course, the objection
I had in mind. If they were made formal parties we would have
frequent cases where the whole equity of the bill would be sworn
away by the respondents."
Representative Beck, speaking of the public officials protection
clause, finds such an inquiry would be an affront to the authorities
of the state; 46 but his colleague, Representative O'Connor, argues,
"The court should not exercise police power if the constituted
authoritiesare willing and able to perform that function.
"'There are, however, exceptional cases in which the federal courts
may issue a temporary restraining order without notice, if necessary,
to prevent irreparable injury to property. The court must first, however,. take testimony under oath rather than by affidavit, and such
47
an order is affected for only five days.."
At the end of his argument as leader of the minority members of
the committee, Senator Hebert addressed the Senate, "In conclusion,
Mr. Prsident, I repeat, that I have no disposition or intention to delay or to interfere with the passage of this bill. I shall offer amendments as we proceed with its consideration which I believe will
more fully protect the interests of all parties of labor disputes. I
have been informed that labor organizations themselves have many
amendments to propose to this bill. It may be that some of those
46. 75 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932).
47. 75 Cong. Rec. 5464 (1932).
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which they intend to offer or which are to be offered at their instance may carry out the purposes which I myself have in mind. I
firmly believe that the substitute which I have proposed will prove
satisfactory to everyone. It will relieve the laboring man from the
injustices which grew out of that form of contract which is so obnoxious to American citizens; it will remove, so far as they can be
removed, the well-founded objections to some of the injunctive processes which have been issued in the past in labor disputes; it will
curb the power of the courts to legislate by injunction as it is claimed they have done and will afford to every citizen the right to a
trial by jury, guaranteed him by the courts."4

G.

"CLEAN HANDS"

Section 8 of the bill might be called the "Clean Hands" provision
of the measure. So Representative O'Connor suggested. That section provides that a complainant shall not be entitled to an injunction if he has not complied with any contract or obligation on his
part or has not made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by
the available methods of arbitration or mediation. Surely, this fundamental principle of equity that "he who seeks justice must do justice" should apply in labor disputes as well as in other judicial controversies."
Representative Beck prophesied the opposite result thusly, "Although the defendants may, without notice, organize industrial war
through fraud, violence and other unlawful acts, the plaintiff shall
not receive injunctive relief unless he first endeavors 'to settle such
dispute either by negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery or mediation or arbitration.
"The aggressor may act without notice, but the aggrieved may not
defend himself by securing injunctive relief without tolerating the
violence until he has gone through various steps of peaceful negotiation. While plaintiff is negotiating, the situation may become beyond any possibility of judicial relief.""0
IV

CONCLUSION

Injunctions have been granted under the Norris-LaGuardia Act
both in the federal courts and in our state court under Section 34-08.
This legislation was not passed to forbid the granting of injunctions,
but rather it was passed to correct the abuse of injunctions. Injunc48. 75 Cong. Rec. 4996 (1932).
49. 75 Cong. Rec. 5464 (1932).
50. 75 Cong. Rec. 5472 (1932).
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tive writs are harsh and should not be granted for light or transitory
reasons. Chief Justice Taft, in an interview, summed up in a pithy
remark what scores of legislators and legal experts have said in volumes. In 1919, Taft said, "Government of the relations between
capital and labor by injunction is a solecism. It is an absurdity. Injunctions in labor disputes are merely the emergency brakes for
rare use and in case of sudden danger. " "

'51. Philadelphia Public Ledger, Nov. 20, 1919, p. 8.
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